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4 
Introduction 
In the past decade, access to information communication technology 
(ICT) has surged across the world. Broadband technology is now availa-
ble to billions more than it was just years ago. The growth has been par-
ticularly strong in mobile-based subscriptions; by 2014 in the developed 
world there were 84 active mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 in-
habitants. Although there were only 21 in 100 subscriptions in the de-
veloping world in the same period, the fastest growth has been in Africa, 
rising from 2 percent penetration in 2010 to almost 20 percent by 2014. 
Add to this a slower but still positive growth in fixed broadband sub-
scriptions, and we see that the world is becoming increasingly wired for 
Internet access.1 
The diffusion of ICT comes with several economic benefits. Electronic 
commerce (e-commerce) can improve efficiency and productivity—but 
there are significant barriers to reaping these and other benefits, partic-
ularly in developing countries. The challenges include poor telecommu-
nications infrastructure, transactional trust, and payment systems.2 
While there is much variation in capacity across the world, Africa is con-
sistently mentioned as the weakest region. According to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union, Africa ranks lowest on their ICT De-
velopment Index, and only two countries in the region score above the 
global average (Mauritius and Seychelles).3 Another survey of network 
readiness shows that the state of ICT infrastructure is particularly poor 
in sub-Saharan Africa, despite the increase in cellphone and Internet us-
ers.4 Not all these issues can be solved solely by building cyber-capac-
ity—but at a minimum the new e-commerce should be stable and safe, in 
order to ensure the consumer and business trust essential for continued 
growth. 
                                                          
1  International Telecommunications Union, The World in 2014: ICT Facts and Figures. 
(Geneva: International Telecommunications Union, 2014). 
2  Japhet Eke Lawrence and Usman A. Tar, “Barriers to E-Commerce in Developing 
Countries,” Information, Society and Justice Journal 3, no. 1 (2010): 23–35. 
3  International Telecommunications Union, Measuring the Information Society Report 
2014 (Geneva: International Telecommunications Union, 2014). 
4  Benat Bilbao-Osorio, Soumitra Dutta, and Bruno Lanvin, “The Global Information 
Technology Report 2014” (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2014). 
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The threats associated with ICT are multifaceted. The present report 
posits that cyber-capacity building (CCB) should not be considered 
simply a risk-management endeavor. The potential for malware, cyber-
attacks, and cyber-crime are not the only challenges associated with the 
rapid spread of ICT. Policymakers must also consider the intersection of 
technology and politics, particularly in developing countries still transi-
tioning into democracies. 
They must do so because ICT can be used to overcome collective ac-
tion problems. Under the right circumstances, this process may mean 
democratization, as the technology can enable more information and 
better coordination between people. In other contexts, however, the 
same technology may enable or accelerate violent rebellion. Govern-
ments can choose from a wide range of policies for confronting either 
situation, but the most harmful would be the application of repressive 
techniques in order to combat peaceful opposition. ICT can potentially 
be either a boon or a threat to democracy; it can aid peaceful opposition 
or violent rebellion; help governments enforce the rule of law or repress 
the population. Formulating a policy for building cyber-security capac-
ity must take these threats and risks into account. 
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Threats, risks and challenges 
This report builds on the assumption that the primary goal of building 
cyber-capacity is to reduce the risk and cost of malicious activity in and 
through cyberspace as incurred by developing countries. This requires 
building institutional capacity within these countries in order to pre-
vent, detect, and handle cyber-incidents. Such incidents generally in-
volve the use of malware to gain unlawful access to networks in order to 
steal information or sabotage processes. Actors may steal sensitive infor-
mation for financial gain, or attack critical national infrastructure (e.g. 
telecommunications infrastructure, power grids, or financial markets) to 
cause widespread disruption. 
These various types of cyber-attacks can cause significant damage, as 
seen in developed countries over the past decade. Estimates differ 
wildly, but the direct costs of cyber-crime are estimated at billions of dol-
lars each year.5 Furthermore, the theft of proprietary information and 
technology, such as military secrets, can have long-term financial and 
strategic costs that are difficult to estimate. It is reasonable to assume 
that also developing countries incur these costs, although the lower level 
of ICT penetration might mean they are less dependent and thus less vul-
nerable to cyber-attacks, resulting in lower costs. Furthermore, people 
in developing countries rely largely on wireless Internet access, and cell-
phone malware is far less developed or widespread than malware on lap-
top and desktop computers. 
While the direct costs of cyber-attacks might be seen as the cost of 
doing business, persistent problems associated with ICT could prove 
more pernicious. As Thomas Rid as has argued, cyber insecurity can un-
dermine trust between the government and the people.6 If the govern-
ment fails to prevent cyber-attacks, the public might see it as ineffectual, 
or even non-legitimate. This problem could become particularly relevant 
as the public becomes increasingly dependent on ICT-based services and 
                                                          
5  For some examples of cost estimates, see: Steve Morgan, “Cyber Crime Costs Pro-
jected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019,” Forbes, January 17, 2016, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-pro-
jected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/. 
6  Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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products. Similarly, the public may lose trust in commerce, if Internet 
fraud and hacking of personal information become commonplace. 
Political opposition and rebellion  
The diffusion of ICT in a society may have various effects on the popula-
tion, but arguably the most important is that the technology helps over-
come problems of collective action and coordination. Through access to 
cellphone networks or social media networks, individuals can more eas-
ily coordinate, mobilize, and form groups. On the positive side, this de-
mocratization of technology may foster democratization itself, as people 
become empowered by access to more information and to others with 
similar interests.7 
Recent years have provided numerous examples of what this process 
looks like in practice. The Arab Spring, starting in December 2010, 
showed how social media could undermine authoritarian regimes. 
While the results have been decidedly mixed for the various opposition 
movements, Marc Lynch describes various ways in which “the new me-
dia” (i.e. television and Internet-based social media) have challenged 
the power of the Arab states.8 As expected, these technologies have pro-
moted collective action in various ways. They have lowered the transac-
tion costs for communications and organization, while also creating in-
formation cascades. Furthermore, TV and social media have affected in-
ternational support for the regimes and lessened government control 
over the public sphere. (Lynch also identifies ways ICT has increased 
government repression, as discussed below.) In sum, the characteristics 
of these movements are similar to those of the technology: highly scala-
ble and easily spread, but possibly flat and lacking robust institutional 
foundations.9 
                                                          
7  For a broad review of the literature on this topic and the various mechanisms for 
overcoming collective action problems by the use of ICT, see R. Kelly Garrett, “Pro-
test in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New 
ICTs,” Information, Communication & Society 9, no. 02 (2006): 202–24. 
8  Marc Lynch, “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Au-
thoritarian Arab State,” Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 02 (2011): 301–10. 
9  As Lynch notes, “The leaderless, network structures which can hold together a dis-
parate coalition of millions of protestors around a single, simple demand—‘Mu-
barak must go’—are typically far less effective at articulating specific, nuanced de-
mands in the negotiation process which follows success. The Internet may prove to 
be poor at building warm social networks and trust that are the heart of civil soci-
ety.” Ibid.: 305. 
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The benefits of ICT for democratization are not universal, however. 
An empirical study10 of protest frequency in 22 countries capable of In-
ternet censorship and filtering found no relationship between increased 
access to the Internet and levels of protests. Increased cellphone access 
was associated with levels of protest, but yielded different effects de-
pending on the specific circumstances. Countries with already-low lev-
els of protest saw a decrease in protests when cellphone access went up, 
while countries with high levels of cellphone access saw an increase in 
protests when cellphone access increased further. These contradictory 
findings indicate that the introduction of ICT by itself has an indetermi-
nate effect on protests, and any outcome will depend on pre-existing po-
litical and economic circumstances. 
Despite some promising features, the diffusion of ICT is not without 
risks. The effects might be highly contingent on a country’s political cir-
cumstances, since peaceful protesters are not the only ones to have prob-
lems in mounting collective action. Rebels and other militant groups can 
leverage ICT to coordinate violent attacks or even set off cellphone-con-
trolled improvised explosive devices. A recent study of political violence 
in Africa found that the availability of cellphone coverage increases the 
probability of violent conflict.11 While cellphone coverage and conflict 
levels vary greatly across the African continent, the findings were ro-
bust, and indicate that cellphones help overcome collective action prob-
lems for rebels and militant groups. However, it is unclear whether these 
results are generalizable. A study of Iraq during the height of its civil war 
(2004–2009) found that cellphone coverage decreased insurgent vio-
lence. 12 The likely explanation, according to the authors, is that cell-
phones allowed non-combatant civilians to report insurgent activity to 
the Iraqi government, thereby aiding their counterinsurgency efforts. 
The results of these two studies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
As the authors of the Africa study note, referring directly to the Iraq 
study: 
                                                          
10 Patrick Philippe Meier, “The Impact of the Information Revolution on     Protest Fre-
quency in Repressive Contexts” (50th International Studies Association Confer-
ence, New York, 2009), 15–17. 
11  Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The 
Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Sci-
ence Review 107, no. 02 (2013): 207–24. 
12 Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, “Is the Phone Mightier Than the Sword? 
Cellphones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq,” International Organization 69, no. 02 
(2015): 247–74. 
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We believe it is reasonable that the effects of cell phones are dif-
ferent across these cases. The context of political violence in Af-
rican countries is much different from that in Iraq. The military 
capacity of the anti-insurgent forces is likely higher in the case of 
the U.S. military and government forces in Iraq. While govern-
ment forces in Iraq have the ability to monitor cell phone activity 
of insurgents, this is much less likely for many African govern-
ments, especially with the more prominent role of private enter-
prises in spreading technology.13 
Thus, the effects of cellphone coverage can go either way, depending 
on the circumstances. One key mechanism here could be the ability of 
the rebels to impose costs on civilians who help the government. Fur-
thermore, the kinds of capabilities and tactics used by the opposing par-
ties could affect levels of violence. Governments with signals-intelli-
gence capabilities and advanced military capabilities could exploit cell-
phone coverage to reduce violence, whereas rebels reliant on improvised 
explosive device attacks could cause violence to increase as cell phone 
coverage improves.14 
Repression and surveilance 
As the above studies make clear, governments can also leverage ICT to 
their advantage. A significant risk here is that when faced with opposi-
tion, be it violent or nonviolent, a government may opt to repress parts 
of its population. The literature on state repression is sizeable, and rife 
with disagreement, but a core finding is what Christian Davenport calls 
the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness.”15 Briefly put: “When challenges 
to the status quo take place, authorities generally employ some form of 
repressive action to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat.”16 The 
                                                          
13  Pierskalla and Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” 221. 
14 Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, “Coordination and Security How Mobile Com-
munications Affect Insurgency,” Journal of Peace Research, 2015, 
0022343314559624. 
15 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Polit-
ical Science 10 (2007): 7. 
16 Ibid. 
Hans-Inge Langø 
 
10 
successfulness of the repression varies greatly, but the literature indi-
cates that there is more repression in the countries that are not fully dem-
ocratic or fully authoritarian (referred to as “murder in the middle”).17 
In talking about repression, we are generally referring to overt repres-
sive actions, such as mass arrests. However, more relevant for the dis-
cussion here are covert repressive actions.  These include electronic and 
physical surveillance—and, unlike overt repression, they are meant to 
remain hidden, even from the specific target. They are targeted at indi-
viduals or groups in order to acquire information about specific or per-
ceived threats to the state.18 It is this type of government repression that 
could benefit most directly from the diffusion of ICT; however, such tech-
niques have also been employed on much larger scales. 
There is a growing body of literature on the intersection of govern-
ment repression and ICT. These new technologies have helped some re-
gimes regain control in the face of democratization trends, in some cases 
even co-opting democratic institutions and processes.19 In fact, one 
study found that authoritarian states planning to repress or prevent an 
independent public sphere were more likely to adopt and expand the In-
ternet than were other autocracies. 20 In this context, governments pro-
mote ICT because they see it as a tool of repression. That study found no 
support for the claim that ICT diffusion led to democratization of the 
states analyzed. 
A groundbreaking study of Chinese censorship of the Internet21 has 
given further support to the view of ICT as a tool for overcoming collec-
tive action problems. The researchers found that the Chinese authorities 
                                                          
17 Helen Fein, “More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in 
the World, 1987,” Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995): 170; Patrick M. Regan and Er-
rol A. Henderson, “Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing 
Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 
1 (2002): 119–36. 
18 Christian Davenport, “Understanding Covert Repressive Action The Case of the US 
Government against the Republic of New Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, 
no. 1 (2005): 120–40. 
19 Regine Spector and Andrej Krickovic, “Authoritarianism 2.0: Non-Democratic Re-
gimes Are Upgrading and Integrating Globally” (49th International Studies Associa-
tion Conference, San Francisco, 2008). 
20 Espen Geelmuyden Rød and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats? 
The Internet in Authoritarian Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 
338–51. 
21 Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows 
Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Sci-
ence Review 107, no. 02 (2013): 326–43. 
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were more likely to censure social network posts aimed at coordinating 
and mobilizing support, than posts criticizing policies or the govern-
ment. 
 Governments can also use more blunt tools to prevent mobilization. 
There have been several instances of authoritarian regimes using net-
work and media disruptions to stifle protest, but the effects have been 
varied. During the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt in 2010, the regime of 
President Hosni Mubarak shut down Internet and cellphone access 
across the country. This blackout actually increased mobilization, how-
ever. Navid Hassanpour argues that this happened because full connec-
tivity is in fact bad for mobilization: with insufficient information about 
the events that were transpiring, Egyptians chose to take to the streets in 
order to become more informed.22 
However, under certain circumstances, network and media disrup-
tion may have tactical advantages for the regime. In Syria the govern-
ment has used blackouts to disrupt dissident coordination in conjunc-
tion with military operations—but done too often, that may prove coun-
terproductive for the regime, as it can serve as an early-warning system 
to the opposition. Such disruption is likely to be most successful when 
used infrequently and temporarily.23 A related study of government-
conducted violence in Syria24 provides further support to this argument. 
Distinguishing between targeted and untargeted killings, the study 
found that higher levels of Internet connectivity were associated with 
higher levels of targeted killings. These findings indicate that ICT ena-
bles better intelligence collection, thus making it easier for the govern-
ment to target specific threats. 
The specific make-up of ICT coverage in a given country has an im-
pact on surveillance and repression. Wireless broadband access far ex-
ceeds fixed broadband access in many developing countries, particu-
larly in Africa. As regards collecting data, it should not matter on the 
technical level whether the population is using mobile phones or desk-
top computers. However, certain operational differences remain. Fixed-
broadband subscribers are easier to track down, as they are locked to a 
specific address, and the subscription is likely to have a name associated 
with it. Wireless users, by contrast, may move about freely, and often use 
                                                          
22 Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption and Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence From Mu-
barak’s Quasi-Experiment,” Political Communication 31, no. 1 (2014): 1–24. 
23 Anita R. Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug Network Disruptions and Violence in Civil Con-
flict,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 352–67. 
24 Anita R. Gohdes, “Information, Connectivity, and Strategic State Repression” (56th 
International Studies Association Conference, New York, 2015). 
Hans-Inge Langø 
 
12 
prepaid cards that do not necessitate identification when purchased. 
However, once identified, wireless users can be more easily tracked by 
triangulating cellphone tower signals, thus monitoring both position 
and movement. To circumvent such surveillance, users may choose to 
forego their own devices or subscriptions. State authorities are less able 
to identify and monitor suspected opposition members when these use 
open Wi-Fi networks or Internet cafés. 
Authoritarian reversal 
If in some circumstances, in certain countries, the diffusion of ICT can 
serve to augment the power of the state, it is not inconceivable that this 
technological change can affect the democratization of the states in 
question. When regimes consolidate and centralize their power, they can 
either arrest or reverse processes of democratization, leading to “author-
itarian reversal.” The literature on this topic has not directly addressed 
the issue of ICT, but some general findings might serve as a useful guide 
to thinking about the problem. 
In general, we know from numerous studies that there is a positive 
relationship between economic development and democratization, 
though the reasons remain unclear.25 There is also some evidence that 
the relationship works in reverse: low growth or economic recessions 
can retard or reverse democratization. Adam Przeworski26 has argued 
that democracy is strong in developed countries but frail in poor ones 
because more income can be redistributed in the former than in the lat-
ter. Democracy in a developed country is thus a more robust equilibrium, 
because more redistribution can take place without endangering it. 
Empirical studies add further nuances to this proposition. It has been 
held that “consolidated” democracies are practically immune to author-
itarian reversal—but how can we know which democracies are truly con-
solidated, and which ones have simply survived for some period due to 
favorable circumstances? The age of a democracy might not be a good 
predictor of continued survival. To account for this lack of observability, 
Milan Svolik has devised various econometric models to measure threats 
to democracy. 27 He finds that previous models have underestimated the 
risk of early reversals while overestimating the risk of late reversals. He 
                                                          
25 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115–44. 
26 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy as an Equilibrium,” Public Choice 123, no. 3–4 
(2005): 253–73. 
27 Milan Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” American 
Political Science Review 102, no. 02 (2008): 153–68. 
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also finds that the only accurate predictor of reversal is economic reces-
sion. Therefore, what threatens the democratic equilibrium might not be 
the level of development per se, but any significant negative change in 
the basis for the economic distribution.  
Despite these findings, economics are not the only predictor of de-
mocratization or reversals. Distinguishing between types of reversals, 
we find temporal variation in the risk. In a later study, Svolik argues that 
democracies consolidate against coups, but not incumbent takeover: 
“Put metaphorically, the risk of a coup appears to be a childhood dis-
ease: its danger disappears once a democracy survives long enough to 
consolidate. By contrast, the accumulation of too much power in the 
hands of an incumbent seems to be a persistent threat to democratic sta-
bility.”28 Truly consolidated democracies might thus be those that are 
sufficiently institutionalized to prevent both types of reversals.29 Regime 
type might also matter, as presidential systems are more likely to expe-
rience reversal.30  
We thus have two potential mechanisms for authoritarian reversal: 
economic recession, and the consolidation of executive power. The for-
mer might be relevant for the discussion here if cyber-attacks sufficiently 
damage the local economy—but that seems a rather farfetched scenario. 
Instead, the risk of incumbent takeover appears more relevant to the is-
sue of building cyber-capacity. If democratic consolidation means insti-
tutionalization and thus decentralization of power away from the exec-
utive, building cyber-capacity can threaten this process. As the state be-
comes better able to monitor its population, repression becomes easier, 
all else being equal. Without appropriate and commensurate institu-
tional checks on this new capacity, power then reverts back to the center. 
While the threat of authoritarian reversal is probably low across the 
board, under certain circumstances the risk might be more than negligi-
ble. The real or perceived threat to the incumbent regime may trigger re-
pressive actions, in turn resulting in reversal or civil war, or both. 
                                                          
28 Milan W. Svolik, “Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and 
the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation,” British Journal of Political Science, 
2012, 21. 
29 Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, “Why Democracies Fail,” Journal of Democ-
racy 19, no. 4 (2008): 57–68; Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization Big 
and Bounded Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 6–7 (2000): 
703–34. 
30 Ko Maeda, “Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown: A Competing Risks Analysis of 
Democratic Durability,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010): 1129–43. 
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Building cyber-capacity in practice 
Given the various threats and risks discussed above, cyber-capacity 
building (CCB) is a difficult policy endeavor. It must serve to help mini-
mize the threat of cyber-attacks and exploitation, while ensuring that re-
cipient governments do not use the tools and capabilities to exert repres-
sion when faced with real or imagined political threats. In general, CCB 
is meant to prevent, detect, and handle cyber-incidents, with various or-
ganizations handling the various stages.31 The components of CCB can 
be further divided into three categories: technological, human, and or-
ganizational resources. The first refers to hardware and software; the 
second, to the people who have the technical skills to use these tools; 
and the third, to building organizations and institutions to put all of 
these components together in a sensible and efficient manner.32 
One of the most common forms of CCB is the formation of a national 
computer emergency response team (CERT).33 Simply put, there are two 
types of CERTs: the radar model, and the rescue model.34 The former in-
volves direct monitoring of data traffic by placing sensors across net-
works. These sensors can detect malware, and can be used as early-de-
tection systems for Internet service providers (ISP) and other critical in-
frastructure networks. This is the model currently used in Norway, where 
the sensor arrangement is voluntary and is publically acknowledged. 
The ‘rescue’ model is based on the active participation of key actors 
                                                          
31 In Norway, NorSIS works on the prevention side by advocating standards and good 
cyber-hygiene. Detection is done by the targeted organizations, other entities that 
observe malicious activity, or NorCERT through its sensor network across Norwe-
gian networks. Handling is usually done by the targeted organizations, sometimes 
with the support of NorCERT. 
32 Capacity can also be divided into different categories, such as human resources, or-
ganizational arrangements, and institutional and legal development. This report fo-
cuses more on technology and less on specific legal developments, since it is eas-
ier to generalize about the former than the latter. See: Patryk Pawlaki, “Developing 
Capacities in Cyberspace,” in Riding the Digital Wave: The Impact of Cyber Capacity 
Building on Human Development, ed. Patryk Pawlaki (Paris: ISSUE, 2014), 9–17. 
33 There can be other government entities relevant for cyber-security. For instance, a 
national agency for coordinating cyber-policy and strategy across the government 
can help with inter-agency cooperation and ultimately strengthen capacity. How-
ever, the risks discussed in this report are most relevant to operational entities like 
a CERT.  
34 Many thanks to Eldar Lillevik, Head of Department for Security Management at DNB, 
for this suggestion on how to conceptualize CERT models. 
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across the country. Instead of receiving signals from sensors, the CERT 
relies on companies, organizations, and individuals to provide infor-
mation about malware and cyber-incidents. The CERT can then provide 
information to other actors at risk, while also helping the targeted actor 
handle the incident. 
The technical and operational differences between these two models 
are readily apparent, but the key political distinction is one of trust. The 
radar model is possible in Norway thanks to trust and transparency be-
tween the government and society—but there are still limits to this trust, 
as evidenced by the contentious recent debate over the Data Retention 
Directive.35 The radar model is probably not viable as an alternative in 
most other countries, particularly in those developing countries which 
have governments that are accountable to the public and that care about 
trust. The experiences of FIRST, a non-profit organization dedicated to 
CCB, lend support to this argument. FIRST does considerable work in de-
veloping countries helping to set up their first CERTs. However, the radar 
model is never on the agenda when working with these countries.36 This 
is in part because FIRST does not support such surveillance, but it could 
also be that those countries seeking help do enjoy have the necessary 
public trust to use the radar model. 
Some countries do use extensive data monitoring, and they are usu-
ally non-democratic. In addition to the countries discussed above (China 
and Syria), numerous other autocracies have structures in place to mon-
itor and censor Internet traffic. Sensors are used in order to detect mal-
ware, but also to conduct deep-packet inspection for checking the con-
tent of data traffic, so that undesirable content can be catalogued and 
filtered out before it reaches the end-user. If we then assume that these 
states are directly connected to Internet switches and ISPs, the same or-
ganization can conduct surveillance of the population and control their 
Internet access (e.g. the Great Chinese Firewall). 
Even without direct access to the ICT infrastructure, states in devel-
oping countries may possess significant capabilities. The Israel–Pales-
tine conflict has assumed new dimensions in recent years, with hackers 
on both sides launching cyber-attacks and stealing sensitive infor-
mation. In 2014 during the Gaza War, various groups attacked Israeli 
government networks. The campaign included a wide range of actions, 
including simple Distributed Denial of Service attacks and the leaking of 
                                                          
35 Phone interview with Ivar Kjærem, Chief Security Officer at the Norwegian Cyber De-
fense Force, August 21, 2015. 
36 Phone interview with Margrete Raaum, FIRST chairwoman of the board July 23, 
2015.  
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several databases.37 After the regular military operation ended, the 
cyber-conflict continued, with both sides stealing and leaking sensitive 
information. According to a Palestinian security official, Palestinian se-
curity officials stole files from an Israeli security agency containing the 
identities of dozens of agents recruited by Israeli intelligence.38 While 
third-party actors have participated in these operations, there should be 
no technical reason why these endogenous capabilities could not be 
used against the domestic population, and not only against outside ac-
tors. 
In some cases, these capabilities come from the private sector. Private 
cyber-security firms are part of a booming industry, and states can buy 
malware tools from various companies. After the hacking of the Italian 
company Hacking Team’s servers, it was revealed that the Ethiopian 
government had received training for hacking and access to the com-
pany’s spy tools as part of a $1 million contract.39 The Ethiopian Infor-
mation Network Security Agency (INSA) then used the tools to spy on 
people associated with the political opposition and even US-based jour-
nalists. Hacking Team has also sold its services to numerous other coun-
tries known for systematically violating human rights, including Egypt, 
Sudan, and Azerbaijan.40  
Given the potential risks associated with these technical capabilities, 
CCB should focus primarily on organizational development and building 
human resources. When FIRST starts working with a country, it usually 
does not start from scratch. There will be some committed officials or 
politicians dedicated to addressing the problems, but they lack formal 
                                                          
37 Gilad Zahavi, “#OpSaveGaza Campaign – Insights from the Recent Anti-Israel Cyber 
Operation,” SenseCy Blog, August 11, 2014, 
http://blog.sensecy.com/2014/08/11/opsavegaza-campaign-insights-from-the-
recent-anti-israel-cyber-operation/; Armin Rosen, “Israel Faced A Huge Wave Of 
Cyber Attacks During Its War With Hamas — And Iran Could Be The Reason Why,” 
Business Insider, August 18, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/israel-faced-
a-wave-of-cyber-attacks-2014-8. 
38 Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas’ Cyber Battalions Take on Israel—Al-Monitor: The Pulse of 
the Middle East,” Al-Monitor, July 29, 2015, http://www.al-moni-
tor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/palestine-israel-internet-cyber-war-hack-
ing.html. 
39 John Leyden, “Hacking Team Mulled Stopping Ethiopia Sales—because of Idiot G-
Men,” The Register, August 17, 2015, http://www.theregis-
ter.co.uk/2015/08/17/hacking_team_ethiopia/. 
40 Cora Currier and Morgan Marquis-Boire, “A Detailed Look at Hacking Team’s Emails 
About Its Repressive Clients,” The Intercept, July 7, 2015, http://theinter-
cept.com/2015/07/07/leaked-documents-confirm-hacking-team-sells-spyware-
repressive-countries/. 
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structures like a CERT.41 There will also be a lack of people skilled in 
cyber-security. FIRST then helps with training people and setting up the 
necessary incident-response teams. However, technical training is only 
the initial step in building capacity. In fact, this component is one of the 
easiest parts—building control mechanisms (e.g. formal oversight) and 
organizational structure requires skills that span a wide range of disci-
plines and are thus much harder to achieve.42 
CCB should use an integrative approach to include as many actors as 
possible, in order to achieve systematic and enduring cyber security.43 
However, integration is particularly challenging, because it involves 
people from different backgrounds and agencies.44 If a CERT has coordi-
nating responsibility across the government, and even with the private 
sector, it must interact with everyone from diplomats to corporate exec-
utives. Thus, we must consider both the internal components of cyber-
security agencies and their interface with other organizations.45 
Exactly what a new CERT should look like depends on the needs and 
resources available. At a minimum, a rescue CERT may consist of one 
secretary with an email list.46 Once the CERT receives notice of a cyber-
incident, that secretary can then forward the information to relevant ac-
tors. The more complex the infrastructure and the larger the threat, the 
greater the organizational requirements become for the CERT, for several 
reasons. First, since cyber-attacks can cause damage across sectors due 
to interdependence, the need for information-sharing becomes para-
mount. The informational complexity of certain cyber-attacks can be too 
great for one actor to handle alone.47 Also, some companies might not 
want to or be able to speak directly to other companies, so they will have 
to rely on a central hub to spread information. Second, some companies 
might not have the technical capabilities to handle particularly complex 
                                                          
41 Interview with Margrete Raaum, July 23, 2015. 
42 Phone interview with Ivar Kjærem, August 21, 2015. 
43 Neil Robinson, “Building Blocks for Strengthening Cybersecurity Capacities,” in Rid-
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ment, ed. Patryk Pawlaki (ISSUE, 2014), 64. 
44 Ibid., 62. 
45 This model draws heavily on Robinson’s conceptualization of a “connected conti-
nents” model of CCB, but leaves open the question of format and whether hierarchy 
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46 Interview with Eldar Lillevik in Oslo, July 6, 2015. 
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incidents. With sufficiently trained staff, the CERT can then help them 
handle these incidents. 
In addition to considering the organizational requirements of such 
entities, we must also think about their placement and relationship with 
others. For a national CERT, this is a tricky balancing act. It must be in a 
position of influence, to remain politically relevant—but it must also be 
relatively autonomous, to avoid being co-opted by security services and 
used for repressive purposes.48 Such co-optation might not even be in-
tentional or aimed at changing the purpose of the CERT. By placing it 
under or close to a security service, the organizational culture of the lat-
ter could influence the former so that offense takes precedence over de-
fense. 
While these risks are real, the organizational aspect of CCB also car-
ries potentially significant benefits. If a CERT or other cyber-security en-
tities are formally established within the government structure, this pro-
cess can help institutionalize authority and thus prevent co-opting. Fur-
ther down the line, this process can help build legitimacy for the govern-
ment, promoting trust between it and the population. However, achiev-
ing these goals might necessitate there being some political institutions 
to begin with: institutions might be both a precondition for and a conse-
quence of CCB. It is essential to think carefully about CCB itself and the 
level of institutionalization, and thus legitimacy and democracy, in the 
receiving state itself.  
This dilemma became evident in Myanmar in 2014. Qatar’s Ooredoo 
and Norway’s Telenor were licensed to help build up Myanmar’s tele-
communications infrastructure. The World Bank pledged $2 billion in 
development aid to help build and reform the sector.49 However, critics 
raised serious questions about the lack of responsible investments. In a 
letter addressed to the World Bank, several dozen non-profit organiza-
tions argued that the new reform project ignored “fundamental issues of 
privacy, human rights, and surveillance.”50 The organizations claimed 
that the World Bank had not prioritized these issues, and that recent My-
                                                          
48 Interview with Lillevik, July 6th, 2015. 
49 Rachel Wagley, “Telecom Investments Threaten Privacy Rights in Burma,” DVB Mul-
timedia Group, February 4, 2014, https://www.dvb.no/analysis/telecom-invest-
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50 “Civil Society Comments:  World Bank Telecom Sector Reform Project, Burma” (U.S. 
Campaign for Burma, January 21, 2014), 2, http://uscampaignforburma.org/im-
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ject_in_Burma.pdf. 
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anmar legislation did not restrain the state from abusing its power: “fail-
ure to address privacy and security issues while expanding connectivity 
and providing technical support and training may further empower the 
government to engage in surveillance, censorship, and other abuses.”51 
This case makes clear the need for investments to go hand-in-hand with 
institutional reform. 
Governmental cyber-security entities also have to relate to organiza-
tions outside the state. This aspect of CCB, commonly referred to as pub-
lic–private partnerships (PPPs), can help build trust and institutionalize 
cyber-security. By no means a panacea, PPPs are still essential because 
in most countries much of cyberspace is either owned or operated by pri-
vate-sector companies. For a CERT, the private sector is both a recipient 
of aid and a source of information, and CCB must help build these rela-
tionships. 
Another dimension often neglected in CCB is the role of civil society 
and non-governmental actors. There are a great many voluntary actors 
helping both governments and private companies to become better at 
cyber-security. These actors range from formal organizations like FIRST, 
to informal networks of technical experts who exchange information 
about vulnerabilities and incidents. As many developing countries lack 
the capital and the human resources needed for adequate defense 
against the many threats in cyberspace, governments should look to 
build capacity externally as well as internally. Some countries have even 
decided to incorporate private citizens into the cyber-defense infrastruc-
ture. The Estonian Defense League, a voluntary national defense organ-
ization, has a separate cyber-defense unit consisting of specialists from 
the public and private sectors who can be mobilized in the event of a 
crisis. Although there are possible command-and-control issues with 
such a structure, it is an undeniable fact that many of the brightest tal-
ents often make their living outside of the government. 
An added advantage of such partnerships is that they help keep 
power decentralized, and, in theory at least, reduce the risk of repres-
sion. Yes, centralized state power can be abused and directed against the 
population. But if the private sector and volunteer actors become part of 
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the security structure, the government becomes reliant on them to main-
tain cyber-security functions. In essence, the partners become veto play-
ers who can challenge policies perceived as illegitimate.52  
                                                          
52 This assumes that the government would not use force or the threat of force to 
maintain partnerships, in which case we would be dealing with vastly different situ-
ations. 
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Policy implications 
As this report has shown, there are risks associated with building cyber-
capacity. While cyber-security will only grow in importance, for both the 
economy and society at large, information communications technology 
as such is value-neutral. Under certain circumstances, its positive poten-
tial may be outmatched by the actions of actors with malicious inten-
tions. Those actors may represent the state or some other organization, 
but this report has primarily focused on the former, as they are the recip-
ients of CCB aid. From the government perspective, ICT is truly a dual-
use purpose: it may be used both to protect and to oppress. The risk of 
repression is nontrivial, but—importantly—it is not uniformly distrib-
uted amongst developing countries. Some countries are at greater risk 
than others, so a major implication of this report is that CCB policies 
must be tailored to each individual recipient country. 
Donor countries should be wary of contributing technical tools. In-
stead, efforts should focus on building organizations and institutions. 
However, this is also slightly paradoxical, as the best way to safeguard 
against repression is the presence of government institutions that pro-
mote accountability and create legitimacy. Many developing countries 
lack these institutions—particularly within cyber-security, since this is a 
relatively new area of responsibility for governments. Donor countries 
should help build institutions along with capacity, as the latter without 
the former may serve to enable repression. At worst, increased capacity 
may even encourage repression, if the state centralizes power and 
strengthens the executive. Here it might be instructive to consider les-
sons from experience with security sector reform, where efforts in Af-
ghanistan and elsewhere have triggered similar dilemmas as those de-
scribed here.53 
In terms of practical recommendations, donors should help recipients 
build national CERTs that coordinate between government agencies and 
between the government and the private sector, particularly owners and 
operators of critical national infrastructure. Donors may even help facil-
itate this cooperation, for instance by connecting governments with the 
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private sector abroad, such as telecommunications companies. Informal 
gatherings can be a good way of sharing best practices and building trust 
among and between organizations, which is an essential prerequisite for 
information-sharing on threats and vulnerabilities. 
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